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The Control Order does bear a number of similarities to the ASBO; both are 
civil orders, breach of which (without reasonable excuse) is a criminal offence 
punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.  In fact, when the Government first 
proposed the creation of the Control Order, some responded by labeling it the Anti-
Terrorist ASBO.1  But there are also a number of dissimilarities.  Apart from the 
obvious fact that they are targeted at different types of behaviour, there is a two-tier 
system of Control Orders – derogating Control Orders (which may deprive an 
individual of his/her liberty) and non-derogating Control Orders (which may only 
restrict an individual’s liberty).  There is no equivalent with ASBOs.  ASBOs may only 
impose negative prohibitions, whereas Control Orders can also impose positive 
obligations.2  Derogating Control Orders last for six months, at the end of which they 
may be renewed.3  Non-derogating Control Orders last for 12 months, at the end of 
                                                
∗ Lecturer in Law, Swansea University.  Thanks to Andrew Halpin, the anonymous referees 
and the participants in the staff seminars at the School of Law, Swansea University and the 
School of Law, University of Birmingham, where earlier versions of this paper were presented, 
for their helpful comments. 
1 See, e.g., HC Deb vol 430 col 310 26.01.05. 
2 Compare Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s. 1(4), with Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, s. 
1(4). 
3 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, ss. 4(8)-(9). 
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which they may also be renewed.4  ASBOs, by contrast, last for a minimum of two 
years and may be indefinite, but there is no procedure for the renewal of an ASBO.5 
The aim of this paper is not simply to list all the similarities and 
dissimilarities between the two remedies.  Its aim is to draw out two deeper themes 
which, it will be argued, not only marked the development of the Control Order but 
also the development of the ASBO several years earlier.  For each theme an apparent 
contradiction will also be identified.  After introducing each remedy the paper will 
examine the first of the two themes – New Labour’s repeated insistence that the 
executive can be trusted to employ wide-ranging powers responsibly – and contrast 
this with their insistence, during the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998, that 
individuals need to be protected against the misuse of state power.  It will then turn 
to the second theme – New Labour’s willingness to circumvent the criminal law – and 
contrast this with their apparent confidence in the criminal law to solve a wide variety 
of societal problems.  The paper will conclude by arguing that these two recurring 
themes and two apparent contradictions indicate a lack of commitment to fostering a 




In 1995 New Labour published the consultation paper A Quiet Life.6  Claiming 
that consultation with the police, local authorities, councillors and MPs had revealed 
‘intense dissatisfaction with the extent and speed of existing procedures’ used to 
tackle anti-social behaviour,7 the paper proposed the creation of a Community Safety 
                                                
4 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, ss. 2(4)-(8). 
5 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s. 1(7). 
6 A Quiet Life: Tough Action on Criminal Neighbours, Labour Party, 1995. 
7 Ibid, at p. 6 
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Order.  Innovatively, breach of this ‘special form of injunction’8 would not amount to 
the normal contempt of court; rather it would constitute a criminal offence.  Although 
the proposal was initially dismissed as ‘merely window dressing on Labour’s part’9 by 
Prime Minister John Major, the pressure exerted by the strong opposition and local 
authorities forced the politically weak government into action.  Part V of the Housing 
Bill (to become the Housing Act 1996) accordingly contained three chapters aimed at 
confronting the problem of anti-social behaviour.10  For New Labour, however, the 
measures did not go far enough.  They proposed a number of amendments to the Bill 
geared at strengthening both its civil and criminal law provisions, including one at 
the Commons Standing Committee stage which would have had the effect of creating 
an Order broadly similar to the one proposed in A Quiet Life.  Although this was 
rejected by the Committee, New Labour continued to pursue the idea of a hybrid 
remedy.  In March 1996, following a spate of high-profile cases, Labour MP Janet 
Anderson introduced a Private Member’s Bill aimed at addressing the problem of 
stalking.  The remedy she advanced – a prohibitory civil order, breach of which would 
constitute a criminal offence – followed the formula of the A Quiet Life proposal.  
This, coupled with pressure from the media, led the Conservative Government to 
hastily publish the consultation paper Stalking – The Solutions.11   The resulting 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 contains a combination of civil and criminal 
law provisions, including two civil orders, breach of which constitute criminal 
                                                
8 Ibid, at p. 8. 
9 HC Deb vol. 262 col. 472 22.06.95. 
10 The three chapters introduced an introductory tenancy scheme, strengthened the grounds 
on which social and private landlords could evict secure tenants for nuisance, and provided 
that a power of arrest may be attached to an injunction obtained by a public landlord against 
one of its tenants (Housing Act 1996, ss. 124-158). 
11 Home Office, 1996. 
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offences12 – leading one commentator to describe the Act as a ‘cuckoo’s egg neatly 
placed by Labour in the nest of the Conservative Government.’13   
Although Home Secretary Michael Howard was keen to stress that the Act’s 
provisions could be used against disruptive neighbours as well as stalkers,14 this did 
not satisfy New Labour.  Shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw claimed that the Act 
contained ‘serious defects,’ pointing in particular to the fact that the ‘civil remedies 
provided by [the Act] are available only at the suit of the individual victim.’15  So, four 
months after their landslide General Election victory, New Labour repeated their 
proposal for a Community Safety Order in a Home Office consultation paper.16  Three 
months later they introduced the Crime and Disorder Bill to the House of Lords, with 
the proposed new remedy, which by now had been renamed the Anti-Social 
Behaviour Order, proudly showcased in clause one of the Bill.  During its passage 
through Parliament, the ASBO faced little opposition.  Only two amendments relating 
to the Order – both tabled by Liberal Democrat peer Lord Goodhart – were pressed 
to a division; both were heavily defeated.  The Bill received Royal Assent on 31st July 
1998, and ASBOs became available on 1st April the following year. 
Despite initial projections that 5000 Orders would be issued a year,17 only 
1017 were reported to the Home Office by the end of 2002.  This low uptake 
                                                
12 ss. 3(6), 5(5).  The first may be imposed in civil proceedings (s. 3) and the other following 
conviction for either the offence of ‘putting people in fear of violence’ or the offence of 
‘harassment’ (s. 5(1)). 
13  A. Rutherford ‘An Elephant on the Doorstep: Criminal Policy without Crime in New 
Labour’s Britain’ in P. Green and A. Rutherford (eds) Criminal Policy in Transition, Hart 
Publishing, 2000. 
14 HC Deb vol. 287 col. 781 17.12.96. 
15 HC Deb vol. 287 cols. 792-793 17.12.96. 
16 Community Safety Order: A Consultation Paper, Home Office, 1997. 
17 HC Written Answers vol. 305 col. 138 27.01.98. 
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prompted several layers of reform, following which a complex regime now governs 
the ASBO – contained in sections 1, 1A, 1AA, 1AB, 1B, 1C, 1CA, 1D, 1E, 1F, 1G, 1H and 
1I of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.  In addition to local authorities and chief 
officers of local police, an Order may now also be applied for by registered social 
landlords, the chief constable of the British Transport Police, Housing Action Trusts 
and (in England) county councils, 18  provided that the statutory consultation 
requirements have been met.19  Applications can be made to the magistrates’ court, to 
the county court and (post-conviction) to the criminal court.20  There is also now 
provision for interim ASBOs.21  An ASBO may be imposed if it is shown that the 
individual has acted in ‘an anti-social manner, that is to say, in a manner that caused 
or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the 
same household as himself,’ and that an Order is necessary to prevent further 
continuation of the behaviour.22  The House of Lords has held that the first of these 
preconditions must be established beyond reasonable doubt, while the second 
requires an exercise of judgment or evaluation.23  The Order must last for a minimum 
of two years (and may be indefinite).24  The prohibitions it imposes must be necessary 
to protect others from further anti-social acts by the defendant, and may cover any 
defined area within, or the whole of, England and Wales.25  To breach an Order 
without reasonable excuse is a criminal offence, punishable by up to five years’ 
                                                
18 s. 1(1A). 
19 s. 1E. 
20 ss. 1(3), 1B & 1C. 
21 s. 1D. 
22 s. 1(1). 
23 R (McCann and others) v Crown Court at Manchester [2002] UKHL 39, [2003] 1 AC 787. 
24 s. 1(7). 
25 s. 1(6). 
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imprisonment in the case of adults,26 and a Detention and Training Order of up to 24 
months’ duration in the case of under-18s.27  The alterations made by the Home 
Office, particularly the introduction by the Police Reform Act 2002 of the post-
conviction ASBO,28 have helped increase the use of the Order.  By the end of 2005, a 
total of 9853 had been made, with the rate at which they are being issued still 
increasing.29 
 
The Control Order 
 
The Control Order celebrated its second birthday on 11 March 2007.  The 
catalyst for the creation of the Order had been the House of Lords’ decision that the 
power under Part IV of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) to 
indefinitely detain foreign nationals suspected of being terrorists was incompatible 
with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).30  Then Home Secretary 
Charles Clarke explained that Control Orders were ‘designed to address directly two 
of the Law Lords’ concerns: discrimination and proportionality.’31  The majority of 
the Law Lords had held that the purported Article 15 derogation from the Article 5 
right to liberty should be quashed (Lord Walker dissenting).  Even if (unlike Lord 
Hoffman) one accepted that there was a public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation, the power of indefinite detention was disproportionate and so not strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation.  The terrorist threat derives from both 
                                                
26 s. 1(10). 
27 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s. 100. 
28 63% of all ASBOs issued between 1/01/03 and 30/09/05 were post-conviction ASBOs 
(figures obtained from Home Office). 
29 1336 were imposed in 2003, 3440 in 2004 and 4060 in 2005 (Home Office website). 
30 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] U.K.H.L. 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68. 
31 HC Deb vol. 430 col. 307 26.01.05. 
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British and foreign nationals, yet the power of indefinite detention only applied to 
foreign nationals.  As Baroness Hale remarked, ‘if it is not necessary to lock up the 
nationals it cannot be necessary to lock up the foreigners.’32  The majority of the Law 
Lords also held that there had been a violation of the Article 14 right to be free from 
unjustifiable discrimination; since the power of indefinite detention did not apply to 
British suspected terrorists, foreign suspected terrorists were being unjustifiably 
discriminated against in their enjoyment of the Article 5 right to liberty.  Clarke 
explained that the Control Order would be available against both British and foreign 
nationals, thus addressing the problem of discrimination.  The problem of 
proportionality would also be addressed since the controls imposed in any given 
would be tailored to meet the threat posed by the particular suspect. 
When the Prevention of Terrorism Bill was first introduced to Parliament, 
much of the media attention focussed on the derogating Control Order.  The Bill 
originally provided that the Home Secretary would be empowered to impose 
derogating Control Orders if an order derogating from Article 5 ECHR had been 
made and if he was satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the individual 
is/had been involved in terrorism-related activity and that the imposition of an Order, 
and each of the obligations contained within it, were necessary.  The Bill stated that, 
if the Home Secretary decided to impose a derogating Control Order, the High Court 
must review this decision within seven days and decide whether there were 
reasonable grounds for it.  If there were such grounds, a full hearing would then 
follow at which the Court would make its own decision whether an Order should be 
imposed.  The failure to provide for any judicial involvement in this procedure prior 
to an individual being deprived of his liberty was fiercely criticised.  Charles Clarke, 
then Home Secretary, claimed that this was justified:  
 
                                                
32 At [231]. 
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‘The Bill gives certain responsibilities to the Secretary of State.  I know that 
some honourable Members would prefer those responsibilities to be allocated 
entirely to the judiciary … [However], the Government’s, and my, prime 
responsibility is to protect the nation’s security.  In many ways, that is our 
paramount task.  Decisions in this area are properly for the Executive, who are 
fully accountable to Parliament for their actions’33 
 
Shadow Home Secretary David Davis described this as ‘a remarkable, novel 
and hazardous doctrine.’34  The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) described 
it as ‘an eccentric interpretation of the constitutional doctrine of the separation of 
powers,’ and insisted that ‘Both Parliament and the Executive have long accepted and 
respected the judiciary’s responsibility for the liberty of the individual.  To invoke 
national security to deny that role is to subvert our traditional constitutional division 
of powers.’  The JCHR added that the absence of judicial involvement prior to the 
imposition of a derogating Control Order would violate Article 5 ECHR.35 
This strong criticism ultimately led to the Government amending the Bill 
during the committee stage in the House of Lords.  Following these amendments, the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 provides that the Home Secretary must apply to 
the High Court for a derogating Control Order.36  If such an application is made, a 
preliminary hearing must take place immediately.37  This hearing may be held in the 
absence of the individual in question, without him being given notice of the 
application, and without him being given an opportunity to make representations to 
                                                
33 HC Deb vol. 431 col. 154 22.02.05. 
34 ibid, col. 157. 
35 Prevention of Terrorism Bill: Preliminary Report (9th Report of Session 2004-05) HC 389, 
paras. 11-12. 
36 s. 1(2)(b). 
37 s. 4(1)(a). 
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the court.38  If the court decides that there is a prima facie case it may impose an 
Order.39  A full inter partes hearing then follows which (unless the court otherwise 
directs) must take place within seven days.40  At this hearing – which may include 
closed sessions, during which the individual is represented by a special advocate41 – 
the court must decide whether to confirm or revoke the Order.42  The court may 
confirm the Order if a derogation order has been made, if the court is satisfied on the 
balance of probabilities that the individual is/has been involved in terrorism-related 
activity, and if it considers that the imposition of obligations on the individual is 
necessary to protect the public from a risk of terrorism.43  The Act also provides that, 
when confirming an Order, the court may modify the obligations which the Order 
                                                
38 s. 4(2).  Although the statutory wording is discretionary, the Lord Chancellor stated that 
preliminary hearings ‘will almost invariably be on an ex parte basis’ (HL Deb vol. 670 col. 364 
3.03.05). 
39 According to s. 4(3), the court may impose an Order if a derogation order has been made, if 
the court believes there is material which is capable of establishing that the individual is/has 
been involved in terrorism, and if it appears to the court that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that the Order and the obligations it contains are necessary to protect the public 
from a risk of terrorism.  
40 s. 4(1)(b); Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132), para. 76.5(1) (as amended by Civil 
Procedure (Amendment No. 2) Rules 2005 (SI 2005/656)). 
41 Schedule 1, para. 7; Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132), paras. 76.22–76.25.  Once 
the Special Advocate has received the closed material relied on by the Home Secretary, he 
cannot communicate about the proceedings with the individual he is representing (para. 
76.25). 
42 s. 4(5). 
43 s. 4(7).  The obligations which may be imposed include those listed in s. 1(4).  A list of 
terrorism-related activities is set out in s. 1(9).  s. 15(1) states that ‘terrorism’ has the meaning 
set out in Terrorism Act 2000, s. 1. 
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imposes.44  Although the JCHR welcomed the greater degree of judicial involvement 
in this amended procedure, it nonetheless voiced several concerns, stating that, 
absent exceptional circumstances, the preliminary hearing should be inter partes, 
that the threshold for the making of an Order at the preliminary stage is very low, and 
expressing concern that the subsequent full hearing may include closed sessions.45  It 
concluded by doubting whether the amended procedure ‘constitutes a sufficient 
safeguard against arbitrary detention to satisfy the basic requirement of legality.’46 
The appropriate procedure for the imposition of a non-derogating Control 
Order was equally contentious.  The Prevention of Terrorism Bill originally provided 
that non-derogating Control Orders were to be made by the Home Secretary.  An 
individual issued with an Order would have a right to challenge it in the High Court.  
The Court hearing such a case would decide whether the decision to impose an Order 
was flawed, which the Bill explained meant that the court should apply the principles 
applicable on an application for judicial review.  In spite of strong criticism of this 
procedure from the JCHR, 47  and from members of both Houses of Parliament, 
Charles Clarke rejected calls for it to be changed to provide for a greater degree of 
judicial involvement prior to the making of an Order.  Stressing that there is ‘an 
                                                
44 s. 4(6).  s. 7(4) also provides that the Home Secretary and the controlled person may apply 
to the court for a derogating Control Order to be revoked or modified. 
45 Prevention of Terrorism Bill (10th Report of Session 2004-05) HC 334, paras. 4-7. 
46 ibid, para. 10. 
47 In its preliminary report the JCHR opined that where an Order infringed an individual’s 
rights under Articles 8, 10 or 11 ECHR, the courts’ limited supervisory jurisdiction could result 
in the infringement being deemed disproportionate.  It added that if the obligations imposed 
amounted to the determination of the individual’s civil rights, there could be an infringement 
of the Article 6(1) requirement that there be a right of access to a court with full jurisdiction 
(n35 above, paras. 15-17).  These concerns were subsequently reiterated in the Committee’s 
full report (n45 above, para. 12). 
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important qualitative difference’ between a deprivation of liberty and a restriction of 
liberty, Clarke explained that he had amended the procedure for the imposition of a 
derogating Control Order because he had ‘reluctantly accepted’ that the making of an 
Order depriving an individual of his liberty ‘was such a serious matter that it could 
not be left in the hands of a Minister.’  However, he argued, this argument does not 
apply to non-derogating Control Orders, because such Orders only restrict an 
individual’s liberty.48  Clarke’s refusal led to the House of Lords accepting, by 249 
votes to 119, an amendment tabled by Liberal Democrat peer Lord Goodhart, which 
provided that non-derogating Control Orders would be made by the High Court, not 
by the Home Secretary.  This defeat, and the concern to ensure that Control Orders 
would be available before the impending release of those detained under Part IV 
ATCSA, meant that, when the Bill was returned to the Commons from the Lords, 
Clarke accepted that ‘some measure of judicial involvement [in the making of a non-
derogating Control Order] is necessary and desirable.’ 49   He accordingly tabled 
amendments to the procedure for imposing such Orders.  These amendments were 
accepted, and formed part of the Bill that ultimately received Royal Assent.   
According to the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the Home Secretary may 
make a non-derogating Control Order if two conditions are satisfied.  The first of 
these – that he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is/has been 
involved in terrorism-related activity – was the subject of much debate.  At 
Committee stage the Lords had changed the standard of proof required from 
reasonable grounds for suspicion to on the balance of probabilities.  This amendment 
was rejected by the Commons, but then reinserted by the Lords.  Finally, after a 32 
hour sitting of Parliament in which the two chambers sent the Bill back and forth a 
total of five times, and after an agreement had been reached that the provisions 
would be reviewed on their first anniversary, the Lords voted to accept the lower 
                                                
48 HC Deb vol. 431 cols. 698-699 28.02.05. 
49 HC Deb vol. 431 col. 1579 9.03.05. 
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threshold of reasonable grounds for suspicion.50  The second of the two conditions 
which must be satisfied for an Order to be made is that the Home Secretary considers 
that the imposition of an Order is necessary to protect the public from a risk of 
terrorism.51  Importantly, though, the Home Secretary may not (save in cases of 
urgency) issue a non-derogating Control Order unless he has first received 
permission to do so from the High Court.52  The Court may grant permission as long 
as it does not consider the Home Secretary’s decision that there are grounds for an 
Order to be obviously flawed.53  In urgent cases the Home Secretary may impose an 
Order without first obtaining permission, but the Order must immediately be 
referred to the High Court for the Court to decide whether the decision to impose the 
Order was obviously flawed.54  A court considering an application for permission to 
make an Order or the making of an urgent Order may hear the case in the absence of 
the individual in question, without him being notified of the application, and without 
him being given an opportunity to make representations to the court.55  After the 
Home Secretary has issued an Order with the High Court’s permission (or an 
urgently made Order has been confirmed) there must follow, as soon as is reasonably 
practicable, a full hearing.56  At the full hearing the Court must decide whether the 
Home Secretary’s decision that the conditions for the making of an Order were 
                                                
50 s. 2(1)(a). 
51 s. 2(1)(b). 
52 s. 3(1).  s. 3(1)(c) provided that Orders could be imposed on those detained under Part IV 
ATCSA, before the expiry of this legislation, without prior permission being obtained from the 
High Court. 
53 s. 3(2). 
54 s. 3(3).  The Court’s consideration of the Order must begin within seven days of the Order 
being made (s. 3(4)). 
55 s. 3(5). 
56 ss. 3(2)(c), 3(6)(b), 3(6)(c). 
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satisfied was flawed, and whether his decision to impose the obligations contained in 
the Order was flawed.57  In deciding whether or not these decisions were flawed, the 
Court must apply the principles of judicial review. 58   If the Home Secretary’s 
decisions were not flawed, the Control Order must remain in force. 59   As with 
derogating Control Orders, the full hearing may include closed sessions, during which 
the individual is represented by a special advocate.60   
The Court of Appeal has considered the procedure for the imposition of a non-
derogating Control Order.61  Disagreeing with the verdict of Sullivan J. in the High 
Court,62  the Court concluded that there had been no breach of the respondent’s 
Article 6(1) ECHR right to a fair hearing in the determination of his civil rights.63  
Lord Phillips CJ explained that the European Court of Human Rights has accepted 
that there are circumstances where reliance on closed material is not incompatible 
with Article 6.  And, whilst ‘this can only be on terms that appropriate safeguards 
against the prejudice that this may cause to the controlled person are in place,’ the 
                                                
57 s. 3(10). 
58 s. 3(11). 
59 s. 3(13).  s. 7(1) states that the controlled person may apply to the Home Secretary for a non-
derogating Control Order to be revoked or modified.  s. 10(1) provides that the controlled 
person also has a right of appeal if the Home Secretary exercises the power under s. 7(2) to 
modify the obligations contained in such an Order without the controlled person’s consent, 
and if the Home Secretary decides to renew an Order. 
60 n41 above. 
61 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2006] EWCA Civ 1140, [2006] 3 WLR 
839. 
62 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2006] EWHC 1000 (Admin), [2006] 
HRLR 29. 
63 Lord Phillips CJ opined that the proceedings did not involve the determination of a criminal 
charge, pointing to the fact that s. 8(2) provides that a terrorist suspect must be prosecuted if 
there is sufficient available evidence (at [53]). 
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provision of a Special Advocate and the accompanying rules of court ‘constitute 
appropriate safeguards.’64  Indeed, in the High Court Sullivan J. had held that the use 
of closed material, when coupled with the appointment of a Special Advocate, does 
not of itself result in non-compliance with Article 6(1).  His conclusion that the 
procedure for imposing non-derogating Control Orders violates Article 6 was strongly 
influenced by the statement in section 3(10) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act that 
the function of the court at the full hearing is to determine whether the Home 
Secretary’s decision to impose an Order was flawed; Sullivan J. explained that this 
limits the court to consideration of the material which was available to the Home 
Secretary at the time he made his decision, which necessarily excludes the 
individual’s response to the allegations and the Special Advocate’s response to the 
closed evidence.  In the Court of Appeal, however, Lord Phillips CJ said that there 
were ‘cogent reasons’ for reading section 3(10) down ‘so as to require the court to 
consider whether the decisions of the Secretary of State in relation to the control 
order are flawed as at the time of the court’s determination.’65  On this interpretation, 
the court at the full hearing may have regard to all available evidence.  This will 
involve forming its own opinion on ‘a matrix of alleged facts, some of which are clear 
beyond reasonable doubt, some of which can be established on balance of probability 
and some of which are based on no more than circumstances giving rise to suspicion,’ 
in order to determine whether the Home Secretary has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the individual is/has been involved in terrorism-related activity.66  
This purposive construction of section 3(10), which Lord Phillips CJ conceded is not 
the ‘natural’ reading of the subsection,67 thus ensures a greater degree of judicial 
supervision over the procedure for imposing non-derogating Control Orders. 
                                                
64 At [86]. 
65 At [46], emphasis original. 
66 At [67]. 
67 At [42]. 
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The first recurring theme: the insistence that the executive can be trusted 
to employ wide-ranging powers responsibly 
 
To illustrate the type of behaviour targeted by the ASBO, New Labour relied 
on two case studies – Family X from Blackburn and the Finnie brothers from 
Coventry.68  Both involved individuals who persistently committed criminal offences 
(including burglary, intimidation, attempted robbery, criminal damage and public 
disorder) in a particular area, making the lives of those living there unbearable and 
intimidating witnesses into silence.  But, in spite of the fact that the ASBO was aimed 
at behaviour of this gravity, in the parliamentary debates on the Order New Labour 
refused to qualify the statutory definition of ‘anti-social behaviour’ as acting ‘in a 
manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or 
more persons not of the same household as himself.’69  The result of this has been 
that enforcement agencies have been able to invoke the legislation in contexts far 
removed from the type of situation for which it was designed.  For example, Kim 
Sutton, a 23 year-old woman from Odd Down, was issued with an ASBO prohibiting 
her from jumping into rivers, canals or onto railway lines after she had attempted 
suicide on four occasions.  After his pigs and geese escaped and caused damage to his 
neighbour’s property, farmer Brian Hagan was issued with an ASBO prohibiting him 
                                                
68 As well as being frequently referred to in the parliamentary debates, the case studies appear 
in both A Quiet Life (n6 above) and the Home Office guidance published in March 1999 (Anti-
Social Behaviour Orders – Guidance, Home Office, 1999). 
69 One of the amendments which Lord Goodhart pressed to a division would have prevented 
an ASBO from being imposed unless the individual acted with an intention to harass or cause 
alarm or distress and his actions were likely to cause serious and justified alarm and distress.  
For an alternative proposal, see S. Macdonald ‘A Suicidal Woman, Roaming Pigs and a Noisy 
Trampolinist: Refining the ASBO’s Definition of Anti-Social Behaviour’ (2006) 69 MLR 183. 
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from letting them escape again.  And 63 year-old Graham Branfield was issued with 
an ASBO prohibiting him from feeding pigeons in his garden.70  Proponents of the 
ASBO respond by claiming that such uses of the Order are exceptional.  Whether this 
is the case or not – and the list of outlandish ASBOs does seem to grow ever 
longer71 – the use of the Order in other contexts for which it was not designed also 
gives cause for concern.  ASBOs are commonly used to prohibit prostitutes from 
soliciting, or to exclude them from a specified area altogether.72  This tactic, which it 
seems merely relocates or buries the problem rather than address it, has had the 
effect of reintroducing the use of imprisonment for ‘common prostitutes’ found guilty 
of loitering or soliciting in a street or public place for the purposes of prostitution, 
even though Parliament abolished the use of custody against those convicted of this 
offence on the ground that it caused unacceptable hardship.73  ASBOs have also been 
used to prohibit (non-aggressive) begging.74  This has been criticised, with the charity 
Crisis arguing that the act of begging is best understood and dealt with as a 
manifestation of social exclusion, and that the use of enforcement measures like 
                                                
70 ‘Woman banned from jumping in the river’ The Daily Telegraph (26.02.05); ‘Pigs that fly 
the coop land owner with Asbo’ The Guardian (14.12.04); ‘Bird lover gets Asbo for feeding 
pigeons’ The Times (31.07.06). 
71 See the list compiled by Statewatch (http://www.statewatch.org/asbo/ASBOwatch.html - 
last visited 14.05.07). 
72 Prostitution appears in the Home Office’s list of behaviours which might give rise to an 
ASBO (A guide to anti-social behaviour orders, Home Office, 2006, p. 8).  See also S. 
Campbell, A Review of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders Home Office Research Study 236, 
Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 2002. 
73 Street Offences Act 1959, s1(1).  See further H. Jones & T. Sagar ‘Crime and Disorder Act 
1998: Prostitution and the Anti-Social Behaviour Order’ [2001] Criminal Law Review 873. 
74 See n71 above.  Like prostitution, begging appears in the Home Office’s list of behaviours 
which might give rise to an ASBO (n72 above, p. 8). 
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ASBOs may exacerbate the problems faced by vulnerable homeless people.75  The 
National Association of Probation Officers thus stated, ‘the original purpose of the 
ASBO has been abused in some areas.  In many incidents, individuals are receiving a 
custodial sentence where the original offence was not itself imprisonable … The ASBO 
is clearly, therefore, moving offenders up tariff and resulting in the inappropriate use 
of custody.’76 
There are also concerns about the use of ASBOs against young people.  During 
the Parliamentary debates on the Crime and Disorder Bill the Government stated that 
the Order would not be used routinely against 10-15 year-olds; this was reflected in 
the draft Home Office guidance produced at the time.77  But in the months between 
the Bill receiving Royal Assent and the ASBO coming into force, in response to strong 
representations from a number of local authorities, the draft guidance was revised, so 
that the version published shortly before ASBOs became available encouraged the 
routine use of the Order against 12-17 year-olds.78  Following this U-turn, just over 
40% of all ASBOs issued in England and Wales up to the end of 2005 were against 
10-17 year-olds.79  The significance of this is that the ASBO was designed for use 
solely against adults, and so infringes key principles of juvenile justice.  The remedy’s 
civil classification, upheld by the House of Lords in R (McCann and others) v Crown 
Court at Manchester, 80  means that it falls outside the diversionary system of 
                                                
75 Memorandum submitted to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry Anti-Social Behaviour, 5th 
Report of 2004-05, HC80, The Stationery Office, 2005, vol II, Ev 35. 
76 Memorandum submitted to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry (ibid), vol III, Ev 185. 
77 Draft Guidance Document: Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, Home Office, 1998. 
78 n68 above. 
79 Information on the age of the recipient is available for 9544 of the 9853 ASBOs issued to the 
end of 2005.  Of these 9544, 3997 (41.88%) were imposed on 10-17 year-olds (Home Office 
website). 
80 n23 above. 
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reprimands and warnings which applies where a child commits a criminal offence, 
with the result that some young people receive ASBOs when other, more constructive, 
forms of intervention would have been possible, that applications for Orders are 
heard in the adult magistrates’ court instead of the youth court, with little being done 
to help the young person understand and participate in the proceedings, and that the 
presumption in favour of anonymity is reversed so that there is instead a 
presumption in favour of disclosure,81 notwithstanding the welfare-based protection 
afforded to young people’s anonymity in the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and the Beijing Rules.82 
During the passage of the Crime and Disorder Bill critics warned that the 
definition of ‘anti-social behaviour’ was too broad, saying that it could potentially be 
applied in a discriminatory manner.  They insisted that a far more tightly-drawn 
definition was needed, which clearly excluded the eccentric, the unconventional and 
the unpopular from its scope.83  They also argued that the Bill should be amended so 
as to provide that ASBOs would only be available against those aged 16 and over.84  
Had these suggestions been heeded, outlandish ASBOs and the use of the Order 
against prostitutes, beggars and young people might have been avoided.  New Labour, 
however, resisted these suggestions.  First, they claimed that the critics’ concerns 
about the definition of ‘anti-social behaviour’ were unfounded since there is a 
                                                
81 Confirmed in R (T) v St Albans Crown Court [2002] EWHC 1129 (Admin). 
82 See further S. Macdonald & M. Telford ‘The use of ASBOs against young people in England 
and Wales: lessons from Scotland’ (2007) 27 Legal Studies (forthcoming). 
83  See A. Ashworth, J. Gardner, R. Morgan, A.T.H. Smith, A. von Hirsch & M. Wasik 
‘Neighbouring on the Oppressive: The Government’s “Anti-Social Behaviour Order” 
Proposals’ (1998) 16(1) Criminal Justice 7. 
84 See the amendment (no. 74) advanced by A.J. Beith, and associated debate, at the Third 
Reading of the Bill in the Commons (23.06.98). 
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filtering process within the legislation,85 adding that the breadth of the definition has 
the advantage of flexibility.  Second, even though they did not anticipate the Order 
being routinely used against those aged under-16, they left the minimum age at ten 
years, insisting that it was sufficient to rely on Home Office guidance to regulate the 
use of the remedy against 10-15 year-olds.  New Labour’s justifications for resisting 
the critics’ suggestions were thus rooted in a benevolent view of state power.  Those 
vested with discretion could be trusted to limit the use of the remedy by operating the 
filtering process within the legislation effectively.  And the Home Office could be 
relied upon to produce, and enforcement agencies to follow, guidance which limited 
the use of the remedy against 10-15 year-olds. 
The debate over the procedure for the making of derogating and non-
derogating Control Orders also stemmed from different views of executive power.   
Critics insisted that the Home Secretary should not be granted the power to make 
Control Orders since his judgment could be influenced by political considerations 
(consciously or otherwise).  In an illuminating paragraph of their final report on the 
Prevention of Terrorism Bill, the JCHR commented: 
 
                                                
85 First, New Labour argued that enforcement agencies faced with frivolous or vexatious 
requests for ASBOs would simply refuse to apply for an Order.  This was reinforced by the 
statutory consultation requirements and by the publication of guidance notes by the Home 
Office.  And even if an enforcement agency were to apply for an ASBO in an undeserving case, 
the court would have complete discretion whether or not to impose an Order (s. 1(4)).  
Moreover, the court hearing the application must disregard any act of the defendant which he 
shows was reasonable in the circumstances (s. 1(5)), may only impose an Order if it is 
necessary to protect others from further anti-social acts by the defendant (s. 1(1)(b)), and 
should only impose an Order if the individual’s behaviour warrants an ASBO of at least two 
years’ duration (s. 1(7)). 
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‘[W]e make a brief observation about whether members of the executive or 
courts are best placed to make the decision as to whether control orders 
should be made in individual cases.  Both the Home Secretary and the Prime 
Minister have been very candid in saying that they are proposing legislation of 
this exceptional kind because they do not want it to be possible for them to be 
accused of not doing more to protect the public in the event of a terrorist 
attack succeeding.  Although we find this sentiment to be entirely 
understandable in elected representatives who are directly accountable to the 
public, we also consider that it demonstrates precisely the reason why 
independent safeguards for individual liberty are essential.  A person who is 
determined to avoid being accused of failing to do more to protect the public 
is extremely unlikely to be the best person to conduct a rigorous scrutiny of 
the strict necessity of a particular order.  That role is best performed by 
independent courts’86 
 
By contrast, New Labour adopted a more benevolent view of executive power, 
insisting that the Home Secretary could be trusted to exercise the power to issue 
Control Orders responsibly.  Charles Clarke reassured the House of Commons that 
‘Control orders … will be used carefully and only in serious cases.  One has only to 
examine how sparingly the [powers under part 4 ATCSA] have been used to see that 
the Government take their responsibilities very seriously and act only when strictly 
necessary, and I believe that the same will be true of the new control orders.’87 
                                                
86 n45 above, para. 16. 
87 HC Deb vol. 431 col. 769 28.02.05.  In the same vein, he told BBC Radio 4’s Today 
Programme that ‘a lot of the discussion around this revolves around the extent to which I as 
Home Secretary, or the Prime Minister, of the Head of the Security Services or the 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police can be trusted with the assessments that we make’ 
(27.01.05). 
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Former Home Secretary David Blunkett delivered a number of speeches in 
which he urged the ‘vital role of good, trusted government in ensuring freedom and 
security.’88  The features of the ASBO and Control Order outlined hitherto are just 
two examples of this benevolent view of state power.  Another stark example is the 
Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006.  The original version of the Legislative 
and Regulatory Reform Bill was fiercely criticised for the breadth of the powers it 
would confer on Ministers; it would have enabled a Minister to amend, repeal or 
replace any existing legislation, including Acts of Parliament, for the purpose of 
‘reforming’ it.  A group of six eminent Cambridge academics warned that this would 
make it possible for the Government, by delegated legislation, to do such things as 
abolish jury trial and rewrite the law on immigration. 89   Jim Murphy (then 
Parliamentary Secretary in the Cabinet Office) attempted to assuage these concerns 
by giving ‘a clear undertaking … that orders will not be used to implement highly 
controversial reforms,’ 90  but this did little to reassure critics.  Although the 
Government subsequently made substantial amendments to the Bill before it received 
Royal Assent in November 2006, many critics remained of the opinion that the 
powers being conferred on Ministers were unnecessarily broad.91  In a similar vein, 
during the second reading of the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill (now Act 2006) 
Charles Clarke responded to suggestions that the offence of incitement to hatred on 
religious grounds could be used to prosecute those who vigorously debate matters of 
religion or who proselytise by stating that the requirement that the Attorney-General 
give his consent before any prosecution is brought and the guidance notes produced 
                                                
88 ‘Security and Justice, Mutuality and Individual Rights’ Lecture at John Jay College New 
York 3.04.03. 
89 See their letter in The Times (16.02.06). 
90 HC Deb vol. 442 cols. 1058-1059 9.02.06. 
91 See, for example, Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Legislative and Regulatory 
Reform Bill (11th Report of Session 2005-2006) HL Paper 194. 
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by the Home Office would ensure ‘that spurious and vexatious cases will not come to 
court.’92  Home Office Minister Paul Goggins echoed these sentiments when the Bill 
returned to the Commons, after the Lords had defeated the Government by amending 
the Bill.  As well as claiming that the need to obtain the Attorney-General’s consent 
would constitute a ‘hurdle … that ought to give people additional confidence,’93 
Goggins sought to reassure the Commons by undertaking ‘personal responsibility to 
ensure that the guidance reflects the legislation that we pass.’94  These comments 
failed to prevent the Commons from voting to accept the Lords’ amendments, only 
the second Commons defeat experienced by New Labour since coming to power in 
1997.95  The first such defeat had come two months previously, during the Report 
stage of the Terrorism Bill.  In spite of Tony Blair’s insistence that the vote came 
down to a straightforward choice whether or not to ‘back the police and those charged 
with fighting terrorism in our country, who tell us—in my view, rightly—that they 
need this power to make our country safe,’96 the Commons voted against giving police 
the power to hold terrorist suspects for up to 90 days without charge, and opted 
instead to increase the maximum detention period to 28 days.97  The offence of 
encouragement of terrorism, contained in clause one of the Bill, also proved 
contentious, in particular the express inclusion within the offence of statements 
                                                
92 HC Deb vol. 435 cols. 671, 679 & 683 21.06.05. 
93 HC Deb vol. 442 col. 196 31.01.06. 
94 ibid, col 203. 
95 The Act thus provides that only threatening (as opposed to threatening, abusive or insulting) 
words/behaviour suffice for the offence, only an intention to stir up religious hatred suffices, 
and there is a provision which expressly protects freedom of expression (Public Order Act 
1986, ss. 29B(1) and 29J). 
96 HC Deb vol. 439 col. 300 9.11.05. 
97 See the alterations made to schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000 by Terrorism Act 2006, 
s.23. 
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glorifying the commission or preparation of (past, present or future) acts of 
terrorism.98  Critics expressed concern that the vagueness of the term glorification – 
which was only added to the offence after plans to create a standalone offence of 
glorification of terrorism had been abandoned in the face of strong criticism99 – 
coupled with the existing broad definition of terrorism, could result in inappropriate 
prosecutions against, inter alia, those who voice support for opponents of, or who 
celebrate the overthrow of, dictatorial and tyrannical regimes.  New Labour sought to 
address such concerns by saying that any such people would be safeguarded against 
prosecution by the fact that prosecutions could only be brought with the consent of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions – ‘an important safeguard’ that should not ‘be 
taken lightly.’100  Such confidence is characteristic of the benevolent view of state 
power that has been described in this section.  The executive can be entrusted with 
broadly drafted powers since it will exercise those powers carefully and responsibly.  
 
The first apparent contradiction: the insistence that individuals need to 
protected against the misuse of state power 
 
This benevolent view of the executive stands in stark contrast to the rhetoric 
which surrounded the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, described by the 
Attorney-General as ‘one of the great achievements of recent years and indeed of this 
                                                
98 Terrorism Act 2006, s. 1. 
99 The Lords voted to remove the glorification limb from the offence at the Bill’s Report stage.  
However, the Commons twice refused to accept this amendment and, in view of the 
Government’s undertaking to review all of the law on terrorism within 12 months, their 
Lordships accepted the glorification limb on the second occasion the Bill was returned to 
them. 
100 Charles Clarke (HC Deb vol. 438 col. 335 26.10.05). 
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Labour Government.’ 101   During the passage of the Human Rights Bill, the 
Government stressed the importance of protecting individuals from misuse of state 
power.  Then Home Secretary Jack Straw urged that ‘[the freedoms that our citizens 
already enjoy] need to be complemented by positive rights that individuals can assert 
when they believe that they have been treated unfairly by the state, or that the state 
and its institutions have failed properly to protect them.’102  These claims of the 
necessity of human rights legislation are at odds with the benevolent view of state 
power outlined above; it is inconsistent to simultaneously stress the potential for the 
state to misuse the powers vested in it and also urge that the executive can be 
entrusted with wide-ranging powers. 
This observation should not be taken as a claim that discretionary power has 
no place in any system of government.  Such a view would be unrealistic; the fact of 
discretionary power is inevitable. 103   Moreover, discretionary power can be 
beneficial. 104   And, since the dangers associated with discretion – such as 
arbitrariness, inconsistency and irrelevant considerations being taken into account – 
can only be expressed in general terms, their relevance in a particular context cannot 
simply be assumed.105  The claim is simply that these issues should be given careful 
consideration before wide-ranging powers are vested in the executive.   
                                                
101 Lord Goldsmith ‘UK Terrorism Legislation in an International Context’ Speech delivered at 
RUSI Homeland Security and Resillience Department (10.05.06). 
102 HC Deb vol. 306 col. 767 16.02.98. 
103 K. Culp Davis Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, University of Illinois Press, 
1971. 
104  L. Gelsthorpe and N. Padfield (eds) Exercising Discretion: Decision-Making in the 
Criminal Justice System and Beyond, Willan Publishing, 2003. 
105 N. Lacey ‘The Jurisprudence of Discretion: Escaping the Legal Paradigm’ in K. Hawkins (ed) 
The Uses of Discretion, Clarendon Press, 1992. 
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The history of the ASBO provides a cautionary tale.  As has been explained, 
the Order was introduced to tackle nuisance neighbours who make the lives of others 
a misery by persistently committing criminal acts and intimidating witnesses into 
silence.  Critics warned of the dangers of the definition of ‘anti-social behaviour,’ but, 
instead of trying to construct a narrower definition, New Labour chose to rely on 
enforcement agencies to operate the legislation responsibly.  The result has been that, 
not only have numerous outlandish ASBOs been imposed, undermining the 
credibility of the Order, but it has also been employed in other contexts, such as 
prostitution and begging, as a heavy-handed instrument of social control.   
The breadth of the discretion vested in the Home Secretary by the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2005 is also a cause for concern.  Although Lord Carlile has stated 
that ‘I would have reached the same decision as the Secretary of State in each case in 
which a control order has been made’ – a statement the Government has used to 
suggest that the legislation has always been used appropriately106 – he immediately 
qualified this with the words ‘… as far as the actual making of the order is concerned,’ 
explaining that ‘In some cases the extent of obligations under the order was more 
cautious and extensive than absolutely necessary.’107  In Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v JJ & others108 the Court of Appeal considered whether the 
cumulative effect of the obligations imposed on six controlees – whose Control 
Orders included an 18 hour curfew, electronic tagging, a requirement to report to a 
monitoring company twice a day, limitation of visitors and pre-arranged meetings to 
persons approved by the Home Office, submission to searches, a prohibition on 
cellular communications and the internet, and a requirement to remain at all times 
within a specified urban area (varying in size from 12.7 to 62 square miles) with 
                                                
106 See the 2006 and 2007 Parliamentary debates on the renewal of the Control Order. 
107 Second Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005, Home Office, 2007, para. 36. 
108 [2006] EWCA Civ 1141, [2006] 3 WLR 866. 
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which they had no previous connection – was to deprive the controlees of their liberty.  
The European Court of Human Rights has held that, since the difference between a 
deprivation of liberty and a restriction of liberty is ‘one of degree or intensity, and not 
one of nature or substance,’ a very onerous combination of restrictions on an 
individual’s liberty falling short of house arrest may nonetheless amount to a 
deprivation of liberty. 109   In the High Court Sullivan J. likened the controlees’ 
situation to detention in an open prison, stating that they were unable to lead a 
normal life and so had been deprived of their liberty.  Since only derogating Control 
Orders may deprive a controlee of his liberty, the Orders breached the controlees’ 
Article 5 ECHR right to liberty, and so were quashed.110  This decision was approved 
by the Court of Appeal, who agreed that the orders in question fell on the ‘wrong side 
of the dividing line.’111   
Another, less onerous, Control Order was upheld by the Court of Appeal in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v E112 since it was adjudged to have only 
restricted the controlee’s liberty.  Whilst broadly similar to the ones in Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v JJ & others, this Order imposed a curfew for a 
period of 12 hours a day as opposed to 18 and contained no requirement to remain 
within a specified geographic area.  However, a further Order has been quashed by 
                                                
109 Guzzardi v Italy (1981) 3 EHRR 333. 
110 [2006] EWHC 1623 (Admin), [2006] ACD 97. 
111 At [23].  The Home Secretary subsequently imposed new, less onerous, Orders (although 
one controlee absconded prior to the Court of Appeal’s judgment, and so the Order could not 
be served). 
112 Secretary of State for the Home Department v E [2007] EWCA Civ 459.  Since the terms of 
the Control Order quashed by the High Court in Secretary of State for the Home Department 
v Abu Rideh [2007] EWHC 804 (Admin) were essentially the same as those in Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v E, it must be concluded that this Order should now be 
regarded as merely restricting the controlee’s liberty. 
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the High Court on the ground that it amounted to a deprivation of liberty.  Although 
this Order allowed the controlee to continue living in the same flat with his father and, 
outside curfew hours, only prohibited him from meeting with six named individuals 
and anyone subject to a Control Order as opposed to requiring all visitors and pre-
arranged meetings to be approved by the Home Office, it did impose a curfew for a 
total of 14 hours a day as opposed to 12 and, importantly, restricted him to an area 
totaling 9.3 square miles.  This limitation cut him off from the area where he used to 
gravitate; in particular, it stopped him from going to the mosques he used to attend 
and prevented him from going to any significant educational establishment where he 
could study English.  Concluding that the Order had ‘cut him off to a large extent 
from his previous life,’ Ouseley J held that the Order amounted to a breach of Article 
5 ECHR. 
The JCHR has urged that the ‘significance of these judicial decisions … should 
not be underestimated,’ stressing that they ‘confirm the concern we expressed a year 
ago that the power to make control orders is being operated in practice in a way 
which is incompatible with the right to liberty in Article 5(1) ECHR.’113  In fact, the 
JCHR’s previous report had urged that some safeguards be built into the legislative 
framework to prevent non-derogating Control Orders from depriving controlees of 
their liberty in the absence of a derogation from Article 5 ECHR.114  When such a 
suggestion was made to Charles Clarke during the legislation’s parliamentary passage, 
his response was that this was unnecessary: 
 
                                                
113 Counter-terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Draft Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
(Continuance in force of sections 1 to 9) Order 2007 (8th Report of Session 2006-07) HC 365, 
para. 27. 
114 Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Draft Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
(Continuance in force of sections 1 to 9) Order 2006 (12th Report of Session 2005-06) HC 915, 
paras. 37-42. 
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‘[T]he Home Secretary is not unlimited in what he or she can do on these 
measures.  First, the Bill itself makes it clear that a control order can impose 
only obligations that the Secretary of State considers ‘necessary’ for 
preventing or restricting further involvement of the individual in terrorism 
related activities … Secondly, the Secretary of State is required by section 6 of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 to act compatibly with the convention rights of 
the individual and his family … [The] concern that there would be some 
process of slide, whereby a combination of non-derogated deprivations that 
added up to a derogation [sic.] would slip past the courts and procedures, is 
simply wrong’115 
 
This comment displays the familiar assumption that the executive will 
exercise its powers impeccably; the Home Secretary can be trusted to act compatibly 
with the Human Rights Act 1998.  Experience, however, has shown that it is 
insufficient to simply trust the Home Secretary to ensure that non-derogating Control 
Orders merely restrict controlees’ liberty and do not deprive them of it. 
It is also telling that both of the recommendations in Lord Carlile’s first 
annual report were aimed at structuring the discretion within the Control Order 
regime.  The first recommendation – motivated by the concern that, since ‘It would 
not be acceptable for significant restrictions on liberty to continue for years on end 
for UK residents,’ investigations should continue with a view to criminal prosecution 
and conviction as long as a Control Order is in place – was the establishment of a 
Home Office led procedure, whereby officials and representatives of the control 
authorities would meet regularly to monitor each case and advise on a continuing 
basis as to the necessity of the obligations imposed on each controlee.116  This resulted 
                                                
115 HC Deb vol. 431 cols. 701-702 28.02.05. 
116 First Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005, Home Office, 2006, paras. 46, 59, 72. 
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in the creation of the Control Order Review Group (CORG), discussed further below.  
The second recommendation related to the obligation placed upon the Home 
Secretary by section 8(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 to consult with the 
relevant chief police officer before making a Control Order about whether there is a 
realistic prospect of bringing a criminal prosecution against the individual in 
question.  Having stated that the letters he had seen from chief police officers 
certifying that there was no realistic prospect of prosecution contained ‘little … by 
way of reasons,’ Lord Carlile insisted that such letters should in future contain ‘clear 
reasons for the conclusion that there is not evidence available that could realistically 
be used for the purposes of a terrorism prosecution.’117  Although this was accepted by 
the Home Secretary,118 Lord Carlile’s second annual report states that the letters sent 
since still fail to give adequate reasons.119 
The rhetoric surrounding the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 
stressed the potential for the state to misuse the powers vested in it.  In spite of this, 
New Labour has shown a willingness to unquestioningly adopt a benevolent view of 
state power.  This has resulted in the ASBO being employed as a heavy-handed 
instrument of social control and the imposition of Control Orders which breach 
controlees’ Article 5 ECHR right to liberty. 
 
The second recurring theme: a willingness to circumvent the criminal 
law 
 
Although one effect of the ASBO has been to broaden the reach of the criminal 
law – an Order may prohibit behaviour that is not otherwise criminal, thus creating ‘a 
                                                
117 ibid, para. 58. 
118 See Charles Clarke’s letter to Lord Carlile dated 26.04.06. 
119 n107 above, para. 57. 
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form of personalised criminal law’120 – behind the creation of the remedy lay the 
conviction that the criminal law was incapable of tackling anti-social behaviour 
effectively.  ‘Nowhere is the failure of the criminal justice system greater than in 
dealing with the problems of local disorder’121 complained Jack Straw.  Two principal 
reasons were given for this failure.  The first, which New Labour illustrated using the 
Family X case study, was that the penalties imposed on perpetrators of anti-social 
criminal acts all too often failed to reflect the aggregate impact of their courses of 
conduct.  The ASBO was designed to remedy this by making it possible to impose a 
single composite sentence.  Breach of an ASBO should, New Labour insisted, be 
viewed as the continuation, in defiance of a court order, of a course of anti-social 
behaviour.  The penalty imposed for breach should therefore reflect the aggregate 
impact of the entire course of conduct.  While at first glance this objective might seem 
to have been frustrated – the courts have insisted that any sentence imposed for 
breach of an ASBO should reflect the seriousness of just the act of breach – the courts 
have also accepted that, where the act of breach also constituted a criminal offence in 
its own right, the sentence imposed for breach may exceed the statutory maximum 
for the standalone offence, thus permitting the imposition of severer sentences than 
would have been possible had no ASBO been in place.122  The second reason for the 
perceived inadequacy of the criminal law, which New Labour illustrated using the 
Finnie brothers case study, was witness intimidation.  Victims of anti-social 
behaviour were often intimidated into silence, which meant that the rule against 
                                                
120 R. Leng, R. Taylor and M. Wasik Blackstone’s Guide to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, 
Blackstone, 1998, p. 13. 
121 HC Deb vol 267 col 549 21.11.95. 
122 R v H, Stevens & Lovegrove [2006] EWCA Crim 255, [2006] 2 Cr App R (S) 453.  The 
decision in this case raises important questions of principle, which are discussed in S. 
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hearsay evidence made it difficult to secure criminal convictions.  In order to avoid 
the application of the hearsay rule, New Labour insisted that applications for ASBOs 
should be classified as civil proceedings.  This classification was subsequently 
confirmed by the House of Lords in R (McCann and others) v Crown Court at 
Manchester, with Lord Steyn commenting that, had their Lordships decided 
differently, the ‘procedure for obtaining anti-social behaviour orders [would have 
been rendered] completely or virtually unworkable and useless.’123 
The ASBO was thus designed to avoid the criminal law’s focus on single events 
and the rule against hearsay evidence.  Instead of circumventing these basic features 
of the criminal law, New Labour could have tried to work within the boundaries of the 
criminal justice process.  Rather than simply assume that the hearsay rule should 
either apply in all cases (criminal proceedings) or in none at all (civil proceedings), 
they could have considered whether the problems presented by witness intimidation 
could have been dealt with within a framework incorporating a principled application 
of the hearsay rule.  The hearsay provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the 
European Court of Human Rights’ approach to Article 6(3)(d) ECHR124 demonstrate 
that such an approach was possible.  Similarly, New Labour could have sought to 
develop the concept of composite sentencing, expounding the circumstances which 
justify imposing one sentence on a course of conduct and considering whether there 
are other contexts in which composite sentencing might also usefully be employed. 
The Control Order’s first two years also suggests a lack of commitment to the 
criminal law.  The Government has insisted that its ‘preferred approach is to 
                                                
123 n23 above, at [18].  For comment on the case, see S. Macdonald ‘The Nature of the Anti-
Social Behaviour Order – R (McCann & others) v Crown Court at Manchester’ (2003) 66(4) 
MLR 630. 
124 See, e.g., Doorson v Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330 and Kostovski v Netherlands (1990) 
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prosecute and convict terrorists,’125 and that the Control Order is a solely a last resort 
way of ‘containing and disrupting those whom we cannot prosecute or deport.’126  
This professed commitment to prosecuting suspected terrorists – which was one of 
the justifications given for the creation of a new offence of preparation of terrorist 
acts in the Terrorism Act 2006 – has nonetheless been questioned, for two reasons.  
First, in addition to the statutory duty to consult with the relevant chief police officer 
before making a Control Order – in relation to which Lord Carlile stated that the 
letters sent by chief police officers have failed to adequately explain why there is no 
realistic prospect of bringing a criminal prosecution against the individual in 
question – the Home Secretary also has a continuing duty to keep the question of 
possible prosecution under review, and to ensure that this review is meaningful.  Yet 
in Secretary of State for the Home Department v E127 the Court of Appeal held that 
the Home Secretary had breached this duty.  Following the imposition of a Control 
Order on E in March 2005, new material became available, in the form of two Belgian 
court judgments in cases in which associates of E were successfully prosecuted for 
terrorism offences.  The judgments came to the notice of the Home Secretary in 
September 2005.  Yet the judgments were not sent to the police, nor to the CPS, and 
when CORG reviewed the Control Order prior to its renewal in March 2006, it did not 
review the question of prosecution in light of the Belgian judgments.  The JCHR thus 
opined that the creation of CORG has done little to address the ‘fundamental lack of 
any systematic approach to keeping the possibility of prosecution under review in 
                                                
125 Charles Clarke (HC Deb vol 431 col 151 22.02.05). 
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control order cases.’  The failure to conduct a meaningful review of the possibility of 
bringing a criminal prosecution against E, coupled with Lord Carlile’s statement that 
‘continuing investigation into the activities of some of the current controlees could 
provide evidence for criminal prosecution and conviction,’ 128  led the JCHR to 
question ‘the seriousness of the Government’s commitment to prosecuting as its first 
preference.  The lack of effective systems to keep the prospects of prosecution under 
review … belies the Government’s professed commitment to do so.’129 
The second reason is the Government’s refusal to lift the self-imposed blanket 
ban on the use of intercept evidence in court.  Various reasons have been given for the 
ban, including an unwillingness to reveal existing technologies and the assertion that 
intercept evidence would be unlikely to assist in prosecuting terrorist suspects.130  Yet 
there is no bar on domestic courts using foreign intercepts obtained in accordance 
with foreign laws or on foreign courts using British intercept evidence if the 
intelligence and security services are willing to provide it.  Nor is there a bar on the 
admission of bugged communications.  In fact, no other country except for the 
Republic of Ireland has such an extensive ban on intercept evidence.  Even though he 
conceded that ‘the availability of such evidence would be rare and possibly of limited 
use’, Lord Carlile recommended that the law be changed to allow intercept evidence 
to be used in those ‘few cases in which it would be appropriate and useful.’131  The 
Director of Public Prosecutions has also recommended that the ban be relaxed, as 
have Lord Lloyd and Lord Newton.132  In fact, the Newton Report set out a number of 
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suggestions for increasing the number of criminal prosecutions, which also included 
the development of a more structured process for the disclosure of evidence and 
adopting an investigative approach in terrorism cases, with a security cleared judge 
being responsible for assembling a fair, answerable case.   
All of this is not to say that special measures to deal with cases where both 
deportation and prosecution are impossible are unnecessary, although this argument 
has been advanced by some.133  Rather it is simply to say that it may be possible to 
reduce the number of such cases.  The failure to attempt to do so reflects a willingness 
to circumvent the criminal law. 
 
The second apparent contradiction: the apparent confidence in the 
criminal law to solve a wide variety of societal problems 
 
Research commissioned by Liberal Democrat shadow Home Secretary Nick 
Clegg found that, up to August 2006, New Labour had created a total of 3023 new 
criminal offences.134  This number – which consisted of 1169 offences introduced by 
primary legislation and 1854 by secondary legislation – constituted almost one a day 
since the party came to power in 1997.  Its magnitude is further illustrated by the fact 
that it is double the rate at which the previous Tory administration created new 
offences, and by the fact that in 1980 it was estimated that there were a total of 7000 
crimes in existence.135  What is more, the rate at which new offences are being created 
is still increasing; 527 new offences were created in 2005, compared with 346 in 
2000 and 160 in 1998.  Clegg concluded that this demonstrates ‘a marked erosion of 
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the trust which should exist between the Government and the governed’ – an irony 
given the first of the themes outlined in this paper. 
The number of new offences has led one leading commentator, Professor 
Andrew Ashworth, to question whether the criminal law is ‘a lost cause’: 
 
‘From the point of view of governments it is clearly not a lost cause: it is a 
multi-purpose tool, often creating the favourable impression that certain 
misconduct has been taken seriously and dealt with appropriately.  But from 
any principled viewpoint there are important issues – of how the criminal law 
ought to be shaped, of what its social significance should be, of when it should 
be used and when not – which are simply not being addressed in the majority 
of instances’136 
 
The inconsistent approach to the criminal sanction outlined in this paper is a 
stark example of this failure to address important questions of principle.  The design 
of the ASBO stemmed from the conviction that the criminal law was incapable of 
tackling anti-social behaviour effectively.  And the Government has been accused of 
relying on the use of Control Orders in cases where it might be possible, perhaps with 
modified rules of evidence, to bring criminal prosecutions, even though it admits that 
prosecuting those suspected of involvement in terrorism is the most appropriate 
course of action.  This willingness to circumvent the criminal law stands in marked 
contrast to the Government’s frequent use of the criminal sanction to tackle a wide 
range of other societal problems, without giving adequate consideration to whether 
the criminal law is capable of tackling those problems effectively, nor whether it is an 
appropriate vehicle for doing so. 
 
                                                




When the Prevention of Terrorism Bill passed through Parliament, many 
expressed anxiety that the Bill’s rapid progress meant there was insufficient 
opportunity to scrutinise its provisions properly.  This resulted in the insertion of 
(what is now) section 13, according to which the Control Order regime would expire 
on its first anniversary unless renewed by the Home Secretary.  Before the Bill 
received Royal Assent Charles Clarke assured the Commons that, once Lord Carlile’s 
report on the Control Order’s first nine months had been published, he would 
introduce fresh counter-terrorism legislation in spring 2006, which would provide an 
opportunity to revisit the Control Order before its first anniversary.  However, 
following the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, Clarke announced that, with 
cross-party agreement, this timetable had been changed.  A new Terrorism Bill (to 
become the Terrorism Act 2006) was introduced in October 2005.  This was 
decoupled from consideration of the Control Order so that, when Lord Carlile’s report 
was published, Clarke announced that he intended to exercise his power to renew the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act by order – thereby limiting examination of the 
legislation to a single debate in each House with no opportunity to table amendments.  
This was condemned by the JCHR, who insisted that the many human rights 
concerns surrounding Control Orders warranted detailed Parliamentary debate and 
scrutiny.137  The Government’s responded by saying that it would introduce a draft 
terrorism consolidation bill in the first half of 2007, which would provide an 
opportunity for a full review of the Control Order regime.  In the event, however, the 
Bill did not appear and, for the second year running, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
was renewed by order – with no guarantee that the consolidation Bill will appear 
before the next annual renewal.  The JCHR described this as ‘a serious breach of 
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commitments made to Parliament,’ lamenting the lack ‘of an opportunity to debate in 
detail and amend the control orders regime in the light of experience of its operation 
and concerns about its human rights compatibility.’138 
This is a further example of what has been the underlying theme of this 
paper – a lack of commitment to fostering a culture of human rights.  During the 
parliamentary passage of the Human Rights Act 1998, New Labour stressed the 
potential for the state to misuse the power vested in it.  In spite of this, they have 
repeatedly displayed a benevolent view of state power, unquestioningly entrusting the 
executive with wide-ranging powers.  This has resulted in the imposition of non-
derogating Control Orders which deprived controlees of their liberty in violation of 
Article 5 ECHR, and in the use of the ASBO in contexts for which it was neither 
designed nor suited.  They have also displayed an inconsistent approach to the 
criminal law.  The combination of stigma and loss of liberty makes the criminal 
sanction the severest deprivation that government can inflict on the individual.  Yet 
New Labour frequently seek to tackle a whole range of societal problems using the 
criminal law, giving inadequate consideration to whether it is an appropriate vehicle 
for tackling those problems and whether it is capable of doing so effectively.  During 
the same period they have responded to the problem of nuisance neighbours who 
persistently commit anti-social criminal acts by constructing the ASBO – which was 
designed to circumvent the procedural protections, principally the rule against 
hearsay evidence, that apply in criminal proceedings – and they have relied on the 
use of extremely restrictive Control Orders – imposed in civil proceedings which 
often include closed sessions involving special advocates – on suspected terrorists 
against whom it might be possible to bring successful prosecutions.  The two 
recurring themes and two apparent contradictions outlined in this paper thus cast 
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doubt upon New Labour’s professed commitment to nurturing a culture of human 
rights. 
